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Abstract
In this talk – based on the results of a forthcoming paper (Coletti, Scoz-
zafava and Vantaggi 2002), presented also by one of us at the Conference
on “Non Classical Logic, Approximate Reasoning and Soft-Computing”
(Anacapri, Italy, 2001) – we discuss the problem of representing default
rules by means of a suitable coherent conditional probability, defined on a
family of conditional events. An event is singled-out (in our approach) by
a proposition, that is a statement that can be either true or false; a con-
ditional event is consequently defined by means of two propositions and
is a 3–valued entity, the third value being (in this context) a conditional
probability.
1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of conditional event (as dealt with in this paper) plays a central role
for the probabilistic reasoning. We give up (or better, in a sense, we generalize)
the idea of de Finetti of looking at a conditional event E|H , with H 6= ∅ (the
impossible event), as a 3–valued logical entity looked on as “undetermined” when
H is false: it is true when both E and H are true, false when H is true and E
is false, while we let the third value suitably depend on the given ordered pair
(E,H) and not being just an undetermined common value for all pairs. It turns
out (as explained in detail in Coletti and Scozzafava 1999) that this function can
be seen as a measure of the degree of belief in the conditional event E|H , which
under “natural” conditions reduces to the conditional probability P (E|H), in its
most general sense related to the concept of coherence, and satisfying the classic
axioms as given by de Finetti (1949), Re´nyi (1956), Krauss (1968), Dubins
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(1975): see Section 2. Notice that our concept of conditional event differs from
that adopted, for example, by Adams (1975), Benferhat, Dubois and Prade
(1997), Goodman and Nguyen (1988), Schay (1968).
Among the peculiarities (which entail a large flexibility in the management
of any kind of uncertainty) of this concept of coherent conditional probability
versus the usual one, we recall the following ones:
• due to its direct assignment as a whole, the knowledge (or the assessment)
of the “joint” and “marginal” unconditional probabilities P (E ∧ H) and
P (H) is not required;
• the conditioning event H (which must be a possible one) may have zero
probability, but in the assignment of P (E|H) we are driven by coherence,
contrary to what is done in those treatments where the relevant conditional
probability is given an arbitrary value in the case of a conditioning event
of zero probability;
• a suitable interpretation of its extreme values 0 and 1 for situations which
are different, respectively, from the trivial ones E ∧ H = ∅ and H ⊆ E,
leads to a “natural” treatment of the default reasoning.
In this talk we deal with the latter aspect.
2 COHERENT CONDITIONAL
PROBABILITY
The classic axioms for a conditional probability read as follows (given a set
C = G × Bo of conditional events E|H such that G is a Boolean algebra and
B ⊆ G is closed with respect to (finite) logical sums, with Bo = B \ {∅} ):
(i) P (H |H) = 1, for every H ∈ Bo ,
(ii) P (·|H) is a (finitely additive) probability on G for any given H ∈ Bo ,
(iii) P (E ∧ A|H) = P (E|H)P (A|E ∧H),
for any A,E ∈ G, H,E ∧H ∈ Bo.
Conditional probability P has been defined on G×Bo; however it is possible,
through the concept of coherence, to handle also those situations where we need
to assess P on an arbitrary set C of conditional events.
Definition 1 - The assessment P (·|·) on C is coherent if there exists C′ ⊃ C,
with C′ = G×Bo, such that P (·|·) can be extended from C to C′ as a conditional
probability.
A characterization of coherence is given (see, e.g., Coletti and Scozzafava
1996) by the following
Theorem 1 - Let C be an arbitrary finite family of conditional events
E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn and Ao denote the set of atoms Ar generated by the (un-
conditional) events E1, H1, . . . , En, Hn. For a real function P on C the following
two statements are equivalent:
(i) P is a coherent conditional probability on C;
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(ii) there exists (at least) a class of probabilities {P0, P1, . . . Pk}, each prob-
ability Pα being defined on a suitable subset Aα ⊆ Ao, such that for any
Ei|Hi ∈ C there is a unique Pα with
∑
r
Ar⊆Hi
Pα(Ar) > 0 ,
(1) P (Ei|Hi) =
∑
r
Ar⊆Ei∧Hi
Pα(Ar)
∑
r
Ar⊆Hi
Pα(Ar)
;
moreover Aα′ ⊂ Aα′′ for α′ > α′′ and Pα′′(Ar) = 0 if Ar ∈ Aα′ .
According to Theorem 1, a coherent conditional probability gives rise to a
suitable class {Po, P1, . . . Pk} of “unconditional” probabilities.
Where do the above classes of probabilities come from? Since P is coherent
on C, there exists an extension P ∗ on G × Bo, where G is the algebra generated
by the set Ao of atoms and B the additive class generated by H1, . . . , Hn: then,
putting F = {Ω, ∅}, the restriction of P ∗ to Ao×Fo satisfies (1) with α = 0 for
any Ei|Hi such that Po(Hi) > 0 . The subset A1 ⊂ Ao contains only the atoms
Ar ⊆ H
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o , the union of Hi’s with Po(Hi) = 0 (and so on): we proved (see, e.g.,
Coletti and Scozzafava 1996, 1999) that, starting from a coherent assessment
P (Ei|Hi) on C, a relevant family P = {Pα} can be suitably defined that allows
a representation such as (1). Every value P (Ei|Hi) constitutes a constraint in
the construction of the probabilities Pα (α = 0, 1, ...); in fact, given the set
Ao of atoms generated by E1, ..., En, H1, ..., Hn, and its subsets Aα (such that
Pβ(Ar) = 0 for any β < α, with Ar ∈ Aα), each Pα must satisfy the following
system (Sα) with unknowns Pα(Ar) ≥ 0, Ar ∈ Aα,
(Sα)


∑
r
Ar⊆EiHi
Pα(Ar) = P (Ei|Hi)
∑
r
Ar⊆Hi
Pα(Ar) ,
[
if Pα−1(Hi) = 0
]
∑
r
Ar⊆H
α
0
Pα(Ar) = 1
where P−1(Hi) = 0 for all Hi’s, and H
α
o denotes, for α ≥ 0, the union of the
Hi’s such that Pα−1(Hi) = 0; so, in particular, H
o
o = Ho = H1 ∨ . . . ∨Hn .
Any class {Pα} singled-out by the condition (ii) is said to agree with the
conditional probability P . Notice that in general there are infinite classes of
probabilities {Pα} ; in particular we have only one agreeing class in the case
that C is a product of Boolean algebras.
A coherent assessment P , defined on a set C of conditional events, can be
extended in a natural way to all the conditional events E|H such that E ∧H is
an element of the algebra G spanned by the (unconditional) events Ei, Hi , i =
1, 2, ..., n taken from the elements of C, and H is an element of the additive class
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spanned by the Hi’s. Obviously, this extension is not unique, since there is no
uniqueness in the choice of the class {Pα} related to condition (ii) of Theorem
1.
In general, we have the following result (see, e.g., Coletti and Scozzafava
1996):
Theorem 2 - If C is a given family of conditional events and P a correspond-
ing assessment, then there exists a (possibly not unique) coherent extension of
P to an arbitrary family K of conditional events, with K ⊇ C, if and only if P
is coherent on C.
Notice that if P is coherent on a family C, it is coherent also on E ⊆ C.
3 ZERO-LAYERS
Given a class P = {Pα}α=0,1,...,k, agreeing with a conditional probability on C,
it naturally induces the zero-layer ◦(H) of an event H , defined as
◦(H) = β if Pβ(H) > 0 ;
if Pα(H) = 0 for every α = 0, 1, . . . , k (obviously, we necessarily have H 6= Hi
for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n), then ◦(H) = k + 1.
The zero-layer of a conditional event E|H is defined as
◦(E|H) = ◦(E ∧H)− ◦(H).
Obviously, for the certain event Ω and for any event E with positive probability,
we have ◦(Ω) = ◦(E) = 0 (so that, if the class contains only an everywhere
positive probability Po, there is only one (trivial) zero-layer, i.e. α = 0), while
we put ◦(∅) = +∞. Clearly,
◦(A ∨B) = min{◦(A), ◦(B)}.
Moreover, notice that P (E|H) > 0 if and only if ◦(EH) = ◦(H), i.e. ◦(E|H) =
0.
On the other hand, Spohn (see, for example, Spohn 1994, 1999) considers
degrees of plausibility defined via a ranking function, that is a map κ that assigns
to each possible proposition a natural number (its rank) such that
(a) either κ(A) = 0 or κ(Ac) = 0, or both ;
(b) κ(A ∨B) = min{κ(A), κ(B)} ;
(c) for all A ∧ B 6= ∅, the conditional rank of B given A is κ(B|A) =
κ(A ∧B)− κ(A) .
Ranks represent degrees of “disbelief”. For example, A is not disbelieved iff
κ(A) = 0, and it is disbelieved iff κ(A) > 0.
Remark 1 - Ranking functions are seen by Spohn as a tool to manage
plain belief and belief revision, since he maintains that probability is inadequate
for this purpose. In our framework this claim can be challenged (see Coletti,
Scozzafava and Vantaggi 2001), since our tools for belief revision are coherent
conditional probabilities and the ensuing concept of zero-layers: it is easy to
check that zero-layers have the same formal properties of ranking functions.
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4 COHERENT PROBABILITYAND DEFAULT
LOGIC
We recall that in Coletti, Scozzafava and Vantaggi (2001) we showed that a
sensible use of events whose probability is 0 (or 1) can be a more general tool
in revising beliefs when new information comes to the fore, so that we have
been able to challenge the claim contained in Shenoy (1991) that probability is
inadequate for revising plain belief. Moreover, as recalled in Section 1, we may
deal with the extreme value P (E|H) = 1 also for situations which are different
from the trivial one H ⊆ E.
The aim of this Section is to handle, by means of a coherent conditional
probability, some aspects of default reasoning (see, e.g., Reiter 1980, Russel and
Norvig 1995): as it is well-known, a default rule is a sort of weak implication.
First of all, we discuss briefly some aspects of the classic example of Tweety.
The usual logical implication (denoted by ⊆) can be anyway useful to express
that a penguin (π) is certainly a bird (β), i.e.
π ⊆ β ,
so that
P (β|π) = 1 ;
moreover we know that Tweety (τ) is a penguin (that is, τ ⊆ π), and so also
this fact can be represented by a conditional probability equal to 1, that is
P (π|τ) = 1 .
But we can express as well the statement “a penguin usually does not fly”
(we denote by ϕc the contrary of ϕ, the latter symbol denoting “flying”) by
writing
P (ϕc|π) = 1 .
(For simplicity, we have avoided to write down explicit a proposition – that is,
an event – such as “a given animal is a penguin”, using the short-cut “penguin”
and the symbol π to denote this event; similar considerations apply to β, τ and
ϕ).
The question “can Tweety fly?” can be faced through an assessment of
the conditional probability P (ϕ|τ), which must be coherent with the already
assessed ones: by Theorem 1, it can be shown that any value p ∈ [0, 1] is a
coherent value for P (ϕ|τ), so that no conclusion can be reached – from the
given premises – on Tweety’s ability of flying.
In other words, interpreting an equality such as P (E|H) = 1 like a default
rule (denoted by 7−→), which in particular (when H ⊆ E) reduces to the usual
implication, we have shown its nontransitivity : in fact we have
τ 7−→ π and π 7−→ ϕc ,
but it does not necessarily follow the further default rule τ 7−→ ϕc (even if we
might have that P (ϕc|τ) = 1, i.e. that “Tweety usually does not fly”).
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Definition 2 - Given a coherent conditional probability P on a family C of
conditional events, a default rule, denoted by H 7−→ E, is any conditional event
E|H ∈ C such that P (E|H) = 1.
Clearly, any logical implication A ⊆ B (and so also any equality A = B)
between events can be seen as a (trivial) default rule.
Remark 2 - By resorting to the systems (Sα) to check the coherence of the
assessment P (E|H) = 1 (which implies, for the relevant zero-layer, ◦(E|H) =
0), a simple computation gives Po(E
c ∧H) = 0 (notice that the class {Pα} has
in this case only one element Po). It follows ◦(Ec|H) = 1, so that
◦(Ec|H) > ◦(E|H) .
In terms of Spohn’s ranking functions (we recall – and underline – that our zero-
layers are – so to say – “incorporated” into a coherent conditional probability,
so that we do not need an “autonomous” definition of ranking !) we could
say, when P (E|H) = 1, that the disbelief in Ec|H is greater than that in E|H.
This conclusion must not be read as P (E|H) > P (Ec|H) !
Given a set ∆ ⊆ C of default rules Hi 7−→ Ei , with i = 1, ..., n , we need to
check its consistency, that is the coherence of the “global” assessment P on C
such that P (Ei|Hi) = 1 , i = 1, ..., n .
We stress that, even if our definition involves a conditional probability, the
condition given in the following theorem refers only to logical (in the sense of
Boolean logic) relations.
Theorem 3 - Given a coherent conditional probability P on a family C of
conditional events, the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) the set ∆ ⊆ C of default rules
Hi 7−→ Ei , i = 1, 2, ..., n ,
represented by the assessment
P (Ei|Hi) = 1 , i = 1, 2, ..., n ,
is consistent;
(ii) for every subset
{Hi1 7−→ Ei1 , . . . , His 7−→ Eis}
of ∆ , with s = 1, 2, ..., n, we have
(2)
s∨
k=1
(Eik ∧Hik) 6⊆
s∨
k=1
(Ecik ∧Hik).
Proof - We prove that, assuming the above logical relations (2), coherence
of P is compatible with the assessment P (Ei|Hi) = 1 (i = 1, 2, ..., n) , on ∆.
We resort to the characterization Theorem 1: to begin with, put P (Ei|Hi) =
1 (i = 1, 2, ..., n) , in the system (So). The unconditional probability Po can be
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obtained by putting Po(Ar) = 0 for all atoms
Ar ⊆
∨n
j=1
(
Ecj ∧Hj
)
, so for any atom Ak ⊆ Ei ∧Hi which is not contained in
∨n
j=1
(
Ecj ∧Hj
)
– notice that condition (2) ensures that there is such an atom
Ak, since
∨n
j=1(Ej ∧Hj) 6⊆
∨n
j=1(E
c
j ∧Hj) – we may put Po(Ak) > 0 in such a
way that these numbers sum up to 1, and we put Po(Ar) = 0 for all remaining
atoms.
This clearly gives a solution of the first system (So). If, for some i, Ei∧Hi ⊆∨n
j=1
(
Ecj∧Hj
)
, then Po(Ei∧Hi) = 0. So we consider the second system (which
refers to all Hi such that Po(Hi) = 0), proceeding as above to construct the
probability P1; and so on. Condition (2) ensures that at each step we can give
positive probability Pα to (at least) one of the remaining atoms.
Conversely, consider the (coherent) assignment P (Ei|Hi) = 1 (for i = 1, ..., n).
Then, for any index j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} there exists a probability Pα such that
Pα(Ej ∧Hj) > 0 and Pα(Ecj ∧Hj) = 0. Notice that the restriction of P to some
conditional events Ei1 |Hi1 , ..., Eis |His of ∆ is coherent as well.
Let Po be the first element of an agreeing class, and ik an index such that
Po(Hik) > 0 : then we have Po(Eik ∧Hik) > 0 and Po(E
c
ik
∧Hik) = 0. Suppose
that Eik ∧Hik ⊆
∨s
k=1(E
c
ik
∧Hik) : then Po(Eik ∧Hik) = 0. This contradiction
shows that condition (2) holds.
Definition 3 - A set ∆ of default rules entails the default rule H 7−→ E if
the only coherent value for P (E|H) is 1. In other words, the rule H 7−→ E is
entailed by ∆ (or by a subset of ∆) if every possible extension (cf. Theorem 2)
of the probability assessment P (Eir |Hir ) = 1 , r = 1 . . . s , assigns the value 1
also to P (E|H).
Going back to the previous example of Tweety, its possible ability (or in-
ability) of flying can be expressed by saying that the default rule τ 7−→ ϕ (or
τ 7−→ ϕc) is not entailed by the premises (the given set ∆).
5 INFERENCE
Several formalisms for default logic have been studied in the relevant literature
with the aim of discussing the minimal conditions that an entailment should
satisfy. In our framework this “inferential” process is ruled by the following
Theorem 4 - Given a set ∆ of consistent default rules, we have:
(Reflexivity)
∆ entails A 7−→ A for any A 6= ∅ ;
(Left Logical Equivalence)
(A = B) , (A 7−→ C) ∈ ∆ entails B 7−→ C ;
(Right Weakening)
(A ⊆ B) , (C 7−→ A) ∈ ∆ entails C 7−→ B ;
(Cut)
(A ∧B 7−→ C) , (A 7−→ B) ∈ ∆ entails A 7−→ C ;
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(Cautious Monotonicity)
(A 7−→ B) , (A 7−→ C) ∈ ∆ entails A ∧B 7−→ C ;
(Equivalence)
(A 7−→ B) , (B 7−→ A) , (A 7−→ C) ∈ ∆ entails B 7−→ C ;
(And)
(A 7−→ B) , (A 7−→ C) ∈ ∆ entails A 7−→ B ∧ C ;
(Or)
(A 7−→ C) , (B 7−→ C) ∈ ∆ entails A ∨B 7−→ C .
Proof - Reflexivity amounts to P (A|A) = 1 for every possible event.
Left Logical Equivalence and Right weakening trivially follow from elemen-
tary properties of conditional probability.
Cut : from P (C|A ∧B) = P (B|A) = 1 it follows that
P (C|A) = P (C|A ∧B)P (B|A) + P (C|A ∧Bc)P (Bc|A) =
= P (C|A ∧B)P (B|A) = 1 .
Cautious Monotonicity : since P (B|A) = P (C|A) = 1, we have that
1 = P (C|A ∧B)P (B|A) + P (C|A ∧Bc)P (Bc|A) =
= P (C|A ∧B)P (B|A) ,
hence P (C|A ∧B) = 1.
Equivalence : since at least one conditioning event must have positive prob-
ability, it follows that A,B,C have positive probability; moreover,
P (A ∧ C) = P (A) = P (A ∧B) = P (B) ,
which implies P (A ∧B ∧ C) = P (A) = P (B), so P (C|B) = 1.
And : since
1 ≥ P (B ∨ C|A) = P (B|A) + P (C|A) − P (B ∧C|A) =
= 2− P (B ∧ C|A) ,
it follows P (B ∧ C|A) = 1.
Or : since
P (C|A ∨B) =
= P (C|A)P (A|A ∨B) + P (C|B)P (B|A ∨B)−
−P (C|A ∧B)P (A ∧B|A ∨B) =
= P (A|A ∨B) + P (B|A ∨B)−
−P (C|A ∧B)P (A ∧B|A ∨B) ≥ 1 ,
we get P (C|A ∨B) = 1.
We consider now some “unpleasant” properties (cf., e.g., Lehmann and Magi-
dor, 1992), that in fact do not necessarily hold also in our framework:
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(Monotonicity)
(A ⊆ B) , (B 7−→ C) ∈ ∆ entails A 7−→ C
(Transitivity)
(A 7−→ B) , (B 7−→ C) ∈ ∆ entails A 7−→ C
(Contraposition)
(A 7−→ B) ∈ ∆ entails Bc 7−→ Ac
The previous example about Tweety shows that Transitivity can fail.
In the same example, if we add the evaluation P (ϕ|β) = 1 (that is, a bird
usually flies) to the initial ones, the assessment is still coherent (even if P (ϕ|π) =
0 and π ⊆ β), but Monotonicity can fail.
Now, consider the conditional probability P defined as follows :
P (B|A) = 1 , P (Ac|Bc) =
1
4
;
it is easy to check that it is coherent, and so Contraposition can fail.
Many authors (cf., e.g., again Lehmann and Magidor, 1992) claim (and we
agree) that the previous unpleasant properties should be replaced by others, that
we express below in our own notation and interpretation: we show that these
properties hold in our framework. Since a widespread consensus among their
“right” formulation is lacking, we will denote them as cs–(Negation Rationality),
cs–(Disjunctive Rationality), cs–(Rational Monotonicity), where “cs” stands for
“in a coherent setting”. Notice that, given a default rule H 7−→ E, to say
(H 7−→ E) 6∈ ∆ means that the conditional event E|H belongs to the set C \∆.
cs–(Negation Rationality)
If (A ∧ C 7−→ B) , (A ∧ Cc 7−→ B) 6∈ ∆
then ∆ does not entail (A 7−→ B)
Proof - If (A ∧ C 7−→ B) and (A ∧ Cc 7−→ B) do not belong to ∆, i.e.
P (B|A ∧ C) < 1 and P (B|A ∧ Cc) < 1 imply
P (B|A) = P (B|A ∧ C)P (C|A) + P (B|A ∧ Cc)P (Cc|A) <
< P (C|A) + P (Cc|A) = 1 .
cs–(Disjunctive Rationality)
If (A 7−→ C) , (B 7−→ C) 6∈ ∆
then ∆ does not entail (A ∨B 7−→ C)
Proof - Starting from the equalities
P (C|A ∨B) =
= P (C|A)P (A|A ∨B) + P (C|Ac ∧B)P (Ac ∧B|A ∨B)
and
P (C|A ∨B) =
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= P (C|B)P (B|A ∨B) + P (C|A ∧Bc)P (A ∧Bc|A ∨B),
since we have P (C|A) < 1 and P (C|B) < 1, then P (C|A∨B) = 1 would imply
(by the first equality) P (A|A∨B) = 0 and (by the second one) P (B|A∨B) = 0
(contradiction).
cs–(Rational Monotonicity)
If (A ∧B 7−→ C) , (A 7−→ Bc) 6∈ ∆
then ∆ does not entail (A 7−→ C)
Proof - If it were P (C|A) = 1, i.e.
1 = P (C|A ∧B)P (B|A) + P (C|A ∧Bc)P (Bc|A) ,
we would get either
P (C|A ∧B) = P (C|A ∧Bc) = 1
or one of the following
P (C|A ∧B) = P (B|A) = 1 ,
P (C|A ∧Bc) = P (Bc|A) = 1
(contradiction).
In conclusion, let us notice the simplicity of our approach (Occam’s ra-
zor...!), with respect to other well-known methodologies, such as, e.g. those
given by Adams (1975), Benferhat, Dubois and Prade (1997), Goldszmidt and
Pearl (1996), Lehmann and Magidor (1992), Schaub (1998).
6 DISCUSSION
Thought-provoking comments of two anonymous reviewers suggested to us to
add this further section.
Among coherence–based approaches to default reasoning (in the framework
of imprecise probability propagation), that of Gilio (2000) deserves to be men-
tioned, even if we claim (besides the utmost simplicity of our definitions and
results) many important semantic and syntactic differences.
First of all, our framework (see the very beginning of our Introduction) is
clearly and rigorously settled: conditional events E|H are not 3-valued entities
whose third value is looked on as “undetermined” when H is false, but they
have been defined instead in a way which entails “automatically” (so-to-say)
the axioms of conditional probability, which are those ruling coherence (the
details, as already recalled in the Introduction, are in Coletti and Scozzafava,
1999).
In other words (french words, since we are in France), “tout se tient”, while
in the aforementioned paper by Gilio a concept such as E|H is interpreted
sometimes as a 3-valued entity looked on as “undetermined” when H is false,
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sometimes as an ordered pair of events, sometimes as a conditional assertion
H |∼ E (in the knowledge base).
Moreover, our notions of consistency and entailment are both different from
his: in fact he gives a theorem (without proof) connecting the notion of consis-
tency to that of Adams (1975).
The problem is that we do not understand Adams’ framework: in fact he
requires probability to be proper (i.e., positive) on the given events, but (since
the domain of a probability P is an algebra) we need to extend P from the given
events to other events (by the way, coherence is nothing but complying with this
need). In particular, these “new” events may have zero probability: it follows,
according to Adams’ definition of conditional probability in the case of a condi-
tioning event of zero probability, that we can easily get incoherent assessments
(see the example below). By the way, in the section “Some preliminaries”,
Gilio claims “We can frame our approach to the problem of propagating im-
precise conditional probability assessments from the probabilistic logic point of
view, see, e.g., Frisch and Haddawy ...”: unfortunately, Frisch and Haddawy
definition of conditional probability coincides (for conditioning events which are
null) with that of Adams, and so it violates coherence as well!
Not to mention that both Gilio and Adams (and many others: some of them
are mentioned at the end of the previous section) base the concept of consistency
on that of quasi conjunction, which is a particular conditional event (and our
concept of conditional event is different from theirs); moreover we deem that the
notion they give of verifiability of a conditional event E|H , that is E ∧H 6= ∅,
is too weak – except in the case H = Ω – to express properly the relevant
semantics.
Our discussion can be better illustrated by the following (very simple) ex-
ample:
Example - Consider two (logically independent) events H1 and H2, and put
E1 = H1 ∧H2 , E2 = H
c
1
∧H2 ,
E3 = H
c
1
∧Hc
2
, E = E2 , H = H3 = Ω .
Given α , with 0 < α < 1 , the assessment
P (E1|H1) = P (E2|H2) = 1 , P (E3|H3) = α
on C = {E1|H1, E2|H2, E3|H3} is coherent; the relevant probabilities of the
atoms are
P (H1 ∧H2) = P (H1 ∧H
c
2
) = 0 ,
P (Hc
1
∧Hc
2
) = α , P (Hc
1
∧H2) = 1− α ,
so that the set ∆ of default rules corresponding to {E1|H1, E2|H2} is consistent.
Does ∆ entail E|H ? A simple check shows that the only coherent assessment
for this conditional event is P (E|H) = 1− α. Then the answer is NO, since we
require (in the definition of entailment) that 1 is (the only) coherent extension.
On the contrary, according to Gilio characterization of entailment – that is:
∆ (our notation) entails E|H iff P (Ec|H) = 1 is not coherent – the answer to
the previous question is YES, since the only coherent value of this conditional
probability is P (Ec|H) = α (see the above computation).
For any ǫ > 0, consider now the assessment
P (E1|H1) = 1 , P (E2|H2) = 1− ǫ ,
so that {E1|H1, E2|H2} is consistent according to Adams, as can be easily
checked giving the atoms the probabilities
P (H1 ∧H2) = ǫ , P (H1 ∧H
c
2
) = 0 ,
P (Hc
1
∧Hc
2
) = 0 , P (Hc
1
∧H2) = 1− ǫ ,
(notice that the assessment is proper). But for any event A ⊂ H1 ∧Hc2 we can
extend P , according to his definition of conditional probability, as
P (A|H1 ∧H
c
2
) = P (Ac|H1 ∧H
c
2
) = 1 ,
which is not coherent!
Finally, there is no mention in Gilio’s paper of Negation Rationality, Dis-
junctive Rationality, and Rational Monotonicity (and, according to one of the
reviewers, these properties do not hold “in default reasoning under coherent
probabilities”, while in our setting they have been proved at the end of Section
5).
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